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The Evolution of Financial Structures
PARALLELING the physical growth of the regulated industries over
the span from 1870 to 1950 was the ever-present need for money
capital. The huge aggregations of equipment and structures for the
railroads, electric power, telephones, and the other components
entailed a draft upon the nation's savings which was at all times very
substantial. In the nation's organized financial markets, the relative
weight of those requirements was even greater. For the establishment
and subsequent growth of the great business units characteristic of
this segment of the economy typically necessitated accumulations of
capital far greater than those at the immediate command of their
organizers and managers. The acquisition of funds from other sources
was a literal prerequisite for their development.
The particular manner in which such funds are acquired, how-
ever, necessarily changes over time, in response to the alterations in
financial institutions, conventions, environmental factors, and the
process of growth itself. It is to the broader pattern of such changes
that we now proceed, with a view to discovering what, if any,
persistent revisions have occurred in the means of financing the
regulated industries over the eighty-year period studied. To focus
attention upon the financial aspect of development, however,
requires a different framework from that used in this volume so far.
In previous analyses we have confined attention to the flow of real
capital—to aggregates expressed in terms of constant dollars and
considered representative, insofar as techniques of deflation permit,
of physical quantities. Present purposes require centering upon the
money flows themselves, unadjusted for price changes.
The Flow of Money Capital
A brief review of the general magnitude of these flows may provide
a useful background for the financial analysis, for the trend of prices
from 1870 to 1950 was sufficiently pronounced to make for significant
differences between the flows of real and money capital. Broadly,
the influence of prices was exercised in opposite directions in two
periods. From the early 1870's through the late 1890's, the trend in
the cost of plant and equipment was gently downward, as the solid
line of Chart 23 shows. In this period, then, the sharp rise in real
capital formation was slightly modified, or dampened, when trans-
lated into money terms. In the following years the opposite trend
appeared and in much greater dimension. From the late 1890's to
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CHART23
Indexes of the Cost of Plant and Equipment of the Regulated Industries
and the Wholesale Prices of All Commodities, 1870—1950
the mid-1920's, -the average price of capital goods increased two and
one-half times. Between 1925 and 1950 there was a further rise Of
about 80 per cent. Over the period 1870—1950 as a whole, the chart
shows, the advance in the cost of plant and equipment was con-
siderably greater than that of the general level of wholesale prices.
In the pre-l896 years,its decline was much more modest; its
subsequent rise was more vigorous. In 1950 the cost of capital goods
was fully three and one-half times as great as in 1870. Over the same
period the general level of wholesale prices barely doubled. Hence
the difference between the magnitude of the advance in the real,
and in the money capital flows of the regulated industries reflected
more than an alteration in the general price level; it mirrored, too,
a revision in the structure of prices which rendered capital goods more




Source: Cost of utility plant
0 0 0 0
05 0 In
9? 9? - 9? 9?
and equipment, Appendix Table 8-10; wholesale prices, Bureau of Labor Statistics.EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL STRUCTURES
CHART 24
o o 0 0 0
— CU U)
The effect is shown in Chart 24, which compares gross capital
formation measured in current and in 1929 dollars. The general
upward trend is very much more pronounced in the former. The
gross flow of funds averaged between 200 and 300 million current
dollars annually in the 1870's and 1880's. By the pre-Worid War I
period, it exceeded one billion current dollars per annum, reached
2.6 billion in the 1920's and about 4.0 billion yearly in the 1940's.
It will be recalled that this flow represents the expenditures of the
regulated industries for plant and equipment; inventory accumula-
tion, which is small in this segment of the economy, is omitted.
Comparison may therefore be made with the gross expenditures of
nonagricultural industry on plant and equipment as measured by
the Department of Commerce. In 1950, when the gross flow of funds
in the regulated industries amounted to 6.5 billion dollars, it repre-
sented 31 per cent of the national total. Since it is these expenditures
which require long-term financing, the importance of the regulated
industries in capital markets is patent.
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Gross Capital Formation, All Regulated Industries, 1874-1946
(nine-year moving averages)
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CHART25
Gross and NetCapital Formation, All Regulated Industries, Current
Dollars, 1874—1946
(nine-year moving averages)
In Chart 25, the gross and the net flow of funds from the regulated
industries are compared. The figures for these and related series are
given in Table 45. Although in real terms, the pace of the advance
in net capital formation in this segment of the economy was retarded
after World War I, the secular trend of the net money flow continued
upward throughout the period of record. But the rise is by no means
as pronounced as in the gross flow. Indeed the difference between
the two expands progressively and swiftly. This difference is of con-
siderable importance, for it represents capital consumption measured
in current prices—i.e. at replacement cost.
It was pointed out earlier that the normal process of growth
ensures that capital consumption must ultimately equal and then
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TABLE 45
All Regulated Industries: Value of Plant and Equipment, Capital Formation, and
























































































l950 78,453 6,488 2,736 3,752
For 1950 only.
Source: Appendix Tables K—5, 6, 7, 8.
the flows are measured in real or in money (current dollars) terms.
In the regulated industries a period of. rough equality in these
money flows came just before the turn of the century. After that
capital consumption drew far ahead; even in 1950 when net capital
formation reached a peak of 2.7 billion dollars, capital consumption
was greater by about one billion.
The close connection between the real stock of-capital and real
net capital formation (the latter representing merely the change in
the former) of course ceases to hold when these quantities are
expressed in current dollars. For a price change will alter the money
value of plant and equipment, either upward or downward, even
in the absence of net capital expenditures. The trend of one cannot
be derived from the other, as would be the case if the influence of
prices were eliminated. In the light of the sharp general upward
trend of prices, compounded as it was with the brisk flow of net
capital expenditures, it is apparent that the growth of the money
value of the plant and equipment of the regulated industries must
have been enormous. The pace of the advance is depicted in Chart
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26.From somewhat more than five billion dollars in the 1870's, the
money value of plant and equipment rose to about 10 billion just
after the turn of the century, and then catapulted to 40 billion in the
1920's and—with the second postwar inflation—to nearly 80 billion
at the beginning of 1950. The spectacular behavior of the money
value of capital, however, should not be permitted to obscure the
underlying trends of the physical quantities described in the previous
chapters. For the relationships among these money flows, since the
influence of prices is common to them all, are much the same as
those which prevail among the real aggregates, despite the one
important difference already pointed out. In this sense, even for
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financial analysis, as we shall see in the following sections, these
"real" trends are of paramount importance.
The Statistical Setting
A study of the financing of capital formation—in an industry or
in the nation as a whole—requires a comprehensive view of the entire
complex of the economic unit's financial transactions. For there is
no way of tracing the route of a particular dollar obtained from some
given source to any of the alternative uses to which it might be put;
nor, since dollars are interchangeable, would there be, any sensible
purpose to such an undertaking. Hence, the sources and uses of
capital funds must be analyzed in their entirety. For present pur-
poses, since our principal interest is in secular development, we
should require a sequence of such analyses, covering successive time
intervals over as much of the 1870—1950 period as possible. We
would in this way acquire a statistical portrait of the evolution of
financial structures, and an opportunity to determine the dominant
tendencies characteristic of it. Compilations framed with this end
in view are presented for four of the principal components of the
regulated industries—railroads, electric light and power, telephones,
and street and electric railways; it was not possible to assemble
appropriate materials for all regulated industries in the aggregate.
The relevant data are given in Tables 46 through 49.
These tables provide information on all of the uses to which
capital funds were put, and on all of the sources of these funds,
during designated periods. Except for statistical errors, of course,
the totals of sources and uses must balance. In the compilation at
hand, however, only percentage distributions are given, although
data on capital formation included at the bottom of the tables
provide a guide to the absolute dimensions of the capital flow under
review. This procedure was adopted for two reasons: (1) assuming
that the time periods selected are reasonably representative, principal
interest in our analysis actually centers in the proportions involved,
rather than in the absolute magnitude of each of the items in the
tables; (2) since the lengths of the intervals studied vary, and since
the proportions of the industries covered also shift over time, com-
parison of the raw data underlying the tables would have been
misleading. Nevertheless some of the characteristics of the basic data
(given in Appendix J) may be noted before proceeding, in order to
make the limitations of our tabulations clear.
In the earlier years the sources and uses of funds were approxi-
mated primarily by calculating the differences in corresponding
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TABLE 47





















1. Gross expenditure on plant and
equipments 89.1 78.2 87.4 94.5
2. Current assets 5.9 10.2 —0.2 8.7
(a) Inventories N N N 3.2
(b) Receivables N N N 1.2
(c) Cash and deposits N N N 4.3
(d) Other current assets N N N b
3.Long-term securities, other than
those in affiliated companies 3.3 3.1 16.4 —0.3
4. Other assets 1.7 8.5 —3.6 —2.9
5. Total uses 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources
6. Retained profits 4.9 5.3 7.3 12.8
7. Depreciation charges 2.7 10.2 16.3 37.5
8. Current liabilities 8.5 7.0 0.9 6.4
(a) Bills and accounts payable 2.7 6.8 N 2.1
(b) Tax liability 5 8 0 1 N 4.1
(c) Other short-term debt J N 0.2
9. Net new issues 82.7 76.6 75.0 44.2
(a) Stocks 49.5 37.1 36.4 18.0
Common 42.0 24.4 N N
Preferred 7.5 12.7 N N
(b)Bonds 38.5 49.8 38.6 24.8
(c)(Less) investments in affiliated
companies —5.4 —10.3 N 1.4
10. Other 1.1 1.0 0.5 —1.0
11. Total sources 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Gross capital formation
Millions of current dollars 1,771 2,067 4,027 10,746
Millions of 1929 dollars 3,856 2,643 4,124 6,752
Detail may not add to 100 because of rounding.
N =Notshown separately.
Includes land.
Less than one.tenth of 1 per cent.
intervals studied. This was the method employed for railroads prior
to 1914, for electric power prior to 1937, for telephones prior to
1913, and for Street railways throughout the period for which data
are presented. It can obviously provide only rough approximations
of the magnitudes we seek, and its use affords another reason for
confining our tabulations to percentage distributions. The most
important source of distortion springing from the procedure followed
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TABLE 49
Sources and Uses of Funds, Street and Electric Railways:
Percentage Distributions








1. Gross expenditure on road and
equipmenta 87.0 96.5 57.1
2. Current assets 2.0 4.7 8.9
(a) Inventories 0.4 N N
(b) Receivables 0.7 N N
(c) Cash and other current assets 0.9 N N
3. Long-term securities, other than
those in affiliated companies 5.0 —1.9 14.9
4. Other assets 6.0 0.7 19.0
5. Total uses 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources
6. Retained profits 1 4 2.2 —12.6
7. Depreciation chargesJ 3.2 26.2
8. Current liabilities 4.8 12.8 13.4
(a) Bills and accounts payable 4.0 —0.6 6.2
(b) Interest, dividends, and taxes
payable 0.7 1.6 19.6
(c) Other short-term debt .J 11.8 —12.4
9. Net new issues 88.2 84.0 66.9
(a) Stocks 49.6 44.2 —5.2
Common N N —13.2
Preferred N N 8.0
(b) Bonds 38.6 54.1 81.1
(c)(Less) investments in affiliated
companies N —14.3 —9.0
10. Other 5.7 —2.2 6.1
11. Total sources 100.0 100.0 100.0
Gross capital formation
Millions of current dollars 1,134 1,410 1,087
Millions of 1929 dollars 2,663 2,643 1,292
Detail may not add to 100 because of rounding.
N =Notshown separately.
aIncludesland.
—especially write-ups. They were particularly pronounced in the
railroads before 1907 (when Interstate Commerce Commission
regulations bearing on accounting procedures were strengthened)
and in street railways before 1913. Their principal effect on our data
is to inflate "expenditures on plant and equipment" on the uses side
and "retained profits" and "net new issues" among the sources.
Checks on the magnitude of distortion, given in Appendix J, suggest
that in some of these earlier periods expenditures on plant and
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equipment may have been overstated for the railroads and electric
power by as much as 24 and 15 per cent respectively. Such checks
were not ayailable for telephones or Street railways, though general
information indicates that the magnitude of write-ups may have
been about the same for the latter and considerably smaller for the
former.
In the later years (railroads after 1914, electric power after 1937,
and telephones after 1913) the tabulations rest on a quite different
foundation, and the apparent degree of accuracy is accordingly
much higher. Distortions arising from changes in value were largely
eliminated, for in the compilations in these years estimated series on
capital expenditures, retained profits, depreciation charges, and net
new issues were directly incorporated. The sources side and the uses
side, each of which was in the main independently estimated, are in
every case approximately in balance.2 Nevertheless, taking the period
of study as a whole, it is apparent that the data of Tables 46 through
49 are to be employed primarily for the detection of major trends
and for the observation of the broader proportionate relations among
the components. Fine differences must clearly be ignored. The
presentation of percentage distributions, rather than the original
data, was designed in part to encourage such interpretation.
The fairly long intervals for which sources and uses have been
compiled also operate in this direction. Generally, the periods are in
the neighborhood of a decade, and vary at the extremes from six to
fifteen years, barring the initial interval for electric power, which
covers the industry from its beginnings to the point at which com-
prehensive accounting data first became available. This telescoping
of time, of course, obscures short-term movements. A brief period of
heavy bond flotations followed by one of equally heavy redemptions
may appear, in summary, as simply "no change" in one of our
intervals. But insofar as that fault permits focusing upon the longer-
term trends, it is in fact an advantage. So, from this point of view,
is the netting-out of changes within the broad industry aggregates
employed. For example, it is of interest that western railroad lines
have in recent years grown in relation to the eastern lines. The
composite changes over time, however, are also of interest, and it is
upon these that emphasis is placed in this study.
The Sources and Uses of Capital Funds
Throughout this volume, the capital formation of the regulated
industries is measured exclusively in terms of expenditures on fixed
capital—plant, road, and equipment. Inventory accumulation is
2SeeAppendix J.
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ignored as of little consequence. The basis for this judgment appears
in the data in the upper panels of Tables 46—49. Generally, inventory
accumulation accounted for less than 3 per cent of all uses of capital
funds against at least 75 per cent for expenditures on plant and
equipment. Only during the relatively brief period of war and
postwar inflation in the railroad component—from 1914 to 1920—
did inventory accumulation appreciably exceed this maximum level;
and in the next two decades there was an offsetting liquidation. Only
in street railways from 1913 to 1922, when contraction in physical
terms was already under way, did expenditures on road and equip-
ment fall appreciably below their minimum level. In all periods for
which data are available, and in all components, inventory accumu-
lation accounted for less than 2 per cent of all uses of funds, compared
with more than 90 per cent for expenditures on plant and equipment.
Indeed, in the pattern of capital uses generally there appears to
have been a considerable degree of stability over time among the
several components. Cash and deposits were built up rather steadily
by amounts varying in the main between 2 and 10 per cent of all
dispositions. Investment in long-term securities was of about the
same size, except for heavy liquidation by the railroads after 1914.
Inventory accumulation was progressive but small. By far the most
important use at all times was expenditures on plant and equipment.
No such stability is to be found in the sources side of the tables.
Here there is evidence of significant trends that apparently persisted
throughout the time span covered, and radically altered the pattern
of financing.
The first and most important of these is the pronounced and
progressive shift over time toward internal financing. In the railroads
this trend is in evidence in its most extreme form. In the 1880's,
railroads secured 98 per cent of capital needs from outside. As in the
case of all regulated industries, very little use then or at any other
time—with one brief exception—was made of short-term credit.
Ninety per cent of all capital requirements were met through the
issue and sale of stocks and bonds. Gradually in the subsequent
periods, the relationship between internal and external sources
shifted. By the decade just preceding the entrance of the United
States into World War I, internal sources had already mounted to
the level of more than 40 per cent of all financial requirements.
About two-thirds of this came from retained profits, the rest from
depreciation charges. Net new issues of long-term securities provided
nearly all remaining funds. Substantial use of short-term credit was
made only during the inflationary surge of the immediately following
years—during World War I and the brief adjacent postwar period
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—when inventories were also accumulated in considerable volume.
But even in these years, the proportion of total capital requirements
financed internally increased, reaching more than 50 per cent.
The next three decades witnessed the climax of this trend. Between
1921 and 1940, 95 per cent of the industry's funds were generated
internally, either through retained profits or depreciation charges.
To be sure, stocks and bonds were issued in this period—amounting
to 26 per cent of all sources in the 1920's and 14 per cent in the
1930's—but this financing was offset almost entirely by the liquida-
tion of current liabilities. In the final decade of the 1940's, all capital
needs were satisfied from internal sources. Long-term obligations,
on balance, were actually reduced, although some short-term debt
was incurred. And it should be borne in mind—as shown by the last
two lines in Table 46—that this was a decade of very substantial
investment. It may be rejoined that it was also a decade of financial
as well as world-wide social and physical turbulence: during the
first half railroads redeemed securities and in the second half
floated new issues, while in the western sector of the country the
expansion of roads offset the contraction in the eastern states.
Nevertheless, our data for the 194 1—49 period show the net results
of these countervailing movements; taking the industry as a whole,
and allowing as always in this study for short-term fluctuations, they
complement neatly a secular trend clearly and steadily in evidence
throughout the preceding years.
The same trend, but in modified form, appears in the other com-
ponents. In electric light and power between 1881 and 1912, less
than 8 per cent of capital funds were generated internally; 83 per
cent was obtained through long-term securities. Between 1913 and
1922, 15 per cent of all capital requirements were obtained internally,
between 1928 and 1937 more than 23 per cent, and between 1938
and 1950 more than 50 per cent. By the latter period net new issues
accounted for only 44 per cent. Internal financing by street railways
accounted for not much more than 1 per cent of all requirements
between 1890 and 1902, and then rose to 5 per cent between 1902
and 1912 and to 14 per cent between 1913 and 1922. Unlike the
first two components, however, the growth of retained profits did not
contribute to this trend. As might be expected in an industry in
which net growth ceased—and was followed by a decline—depreci-
ation charges accounted for the entire expansion in internal sources.
In telephones the trend toward internal financing was more
uneven than in any of the other components. Between 1891 and 1920
the contribution of internal sources mounted briskly, rising from 6
to nearly 60 per cent, with both retained profits and depreciation
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charges expanding. The succeeding decade, however, was one of
unusually high investment and the rise in retained profits in this
period was more than balanced by the relative decline in depreciation
charges. Compared with the preceding war years, then, there was
sonic reduction in the proportion of internal funds taken as a whole,
though it remained greater than in all previous years. In the
depressed 1930's, depreciation charges accounted for all capital
requirements. In the decade of the 1940's, substantial expansion and
some tendency toward a profit squeeze were coupled with the
maintenance of the distinctive dividend policy of this component.
Together, they contributed toward limiting the role of internal
financing. The proportion of capital funds obtained through gross
saving was somewhat below that of any of the intervals back to 1913,
though still substantially above that of the intervals prior to 1913.
Broadly, in this component, the trend toward internal financing
was evident over the 1877—1950 span, though less distinct than in
the other regulated industries.
The Anatomy of Internal Financing
In this section we explore the reasons underlying the secular
advance in the rate of internal financing. We seek a quantitative
explanation—that is, one which may be tested against, and weighed
by, the data at our disposal. A first step toward this objective is to
define the variables strategic for our problem.
Note, first, that we are dealing with a ratio—the proportion of all
Sources of capital represented by retained earnings and depreciation
charges. In the appendix to this chapter we derive a formula which
relates the various measurable factors influencing this ratio's secular
trend. Within the framework adopted, the variables identified are
exhaustive—i.e. they embrace, directly or indirectly, all the factors
which affect the rate of internal financing. We summarize these
below. Following the summary, we test their actual importance in
the determination of the trends observed in the regulated industries.
As might be expected in a financial analysis, all variables dealt with
are measured in current dollars. Our formula is as follows:
r —grossretained earnings—ab+ k
total uses of funds—cx+ 1
where r is the rate of internal financing, a is the net rate of savings,
b is the profit rate, k is the depreciation rate, cx is the net rate of
capital flow, andis the rate of capital consumption. Our numer-
ator, therefore, breaks down the totality of gross retained earnings
into its main components. Our denominator does the same for the
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total uses of funds. Since total uses are necessarily equal to the total
sources of funds, our formula represents simply one way of expressing
the rate of internal financing. The significance of the variables cited
will become clearer in the further discussion of their definitions
which follows.
DIRECTLY RELATED VARIABLES
Our formula isolates three variables, in the numerator, which
vary directly with the rate of internal financing. The first of these is
the net rate of savings (a), defined as the ratio of retained profits to
total profits. Obviously, with other things being equal, an advance in
the net savings rate would raise the rate of internal financing. The
second factor is the profit rate (b), defined as the ratio of net profits
to the value of total assets. If the profit rate advances while all other
variables (including the net savings rate) remain unchanged, the
rate of internal financing will also rise automatically. The final
factor in this group is the depreciation rate (k), defined for our
special purpose as the ratio of depreciation charges to the value of
total assets. This, too, varies directly with the rate of internal
financing, ceteris paribus.
INVERSELY RELATED VARIABLES
The formula isolates two variables in the denominator which vary
inversely with the rate of internal financing. These are the net rate
of capital flow ()andthe rate of capital consumption (3). The first
is defined as the ratio of all capital uses, net of capital consumption, to
the value of total assets. If numerator and denominator of this ratio
were expressed in constant dollars, it would represent the rate of
growth of an industry's assets (viewed as physical goods and com-
mand over physical goods). Measured in current dollars—as it is in
our formulation—it roughly approximates this.3 If the net rate of
capital flow declines, other things being equal, the rate of internal
financing must increase. Totally aside from the obvious algebra,
this is understandable if we consider that the net flow of capital
represents a use of funds. If total uses decline, while retained gross
earnings remain unchanged, then the rate of internal financing
automatically rises. The same consequence follows if the net rate of
capital flow diminishes, while the other variables in our formulation
remain unaltered.
The rate of capital consumption is defined as the ratio of capital
consumption to the value of total assets. Since all our measurements
are in current dollars, capital consumption covers the using up of
See the appendix to this chapter.
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capital (through wear, obsolescence, etc.) at replacement cost. The
replacement of capital consumed, of course, also represents a use of
funds. If the rate of capital consumption rose, while all the other
variables remained unchanged, the rate of internal financing would
decrease. Bear in mind that capital consumption is not the same as a
depreciation charge.In the nineteenth centuryallindustries
experienced capital consumption, but in many of them—before the
general spread of accounting practice—depreciation charges were
zero.
We shall shortly investigate the behavior of the strategic ratios
contained in this equation for the light they may cast upon. the
changing proportions of internal financing to the total sources of
capital. But we pause first for a few additional remarks concerning
the distinction our formula draws between capital consumption and
depreciation charges.
In the earlier years of our study, especially, this distinction is
crucial, though it is at all times important. For depreciation ac-
counting was not widely adopted in industry at large nor in the
regulated segment. Thus in the railroad component in 1880—90,
though it is not shown separately in Table 46, zero is an excellent
estimate of the volume of depreciation charges. The same estimate
would not hold in other segments, but even here it is probable that
there was some deficiency in usage. Insofar as there was, it was
gradually eliminated by the pressure of regulating agencies, the
courts, and finally the exigencies of the income tax. Depreciation
accounting came more and more into use, and was applied to an
ever wider range of the stock of capital. Other things being equal,
this was a factor making for greater internal financing. But of course
it cannot be contended that under such circumstances other things
would actually have remained unchanged.
Thus, a reduction in the reported profit rate would result inevi-
tably from the adoption of depreciation accounting in the early days
of an industry in which capital was long-lived. Conceivably, gross
saving could remain unchanged. On the other hand, however, there
is some likelihood that a rise in depreciation charges would stimulate
an advance in the rate of net retention. For there is an obvious
motivation for maintaining dividends within some distance of the
bounds of reported profits. Suppose, for example, that the retention
rate had been zero before the adoption of depreciation accounting
—and in some firms it probably was. Then the product ab in the
above equation, as well as k, would have been zero. Our contention
is that if the depreciation rate (k) had become positive under such
circumstances it is unlikely that ab would have gone negative by a
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corresponding amount, i.e. dividend payments would not in general
have been maintained for very long at the price of a reduction in
the value of total assets. Because of financial convention, therefore,
the adoption of depreciation accounting may have had the effect of
increasing the magnitude of gross savings and of the proportion of
all capital uses financed internally. Whatever its extent—and some
light is cast on this below—the influence of this factor had probably
petered out by the time of World War I, or somewhat earlier. For
depreciation accounting had by then been generally adopted.
We shall now apply our formula to a quantitative analysis of the
factors underlying the growth of internal financing. The essential
data required are given in Table 50. For this tabulation we have
computed estimates of oc and 9 during the initial time interval
covered in the sources and uses tables for each of the components,
and for the corresponding final interval. The over-all time span
covered is,then, thirty years for street railways, sixty years for
telephones, and seventy years for the others. Thus, for the railroads,
TABLE 50











Net rate of capital flow°
Steam railroads 3.2 1.4 0.2
Electric light and power 14.2 8.6 3.2
Telephones 17.5 10.6 9.3
Street and electric railways 12.1 ... —1.5
Rate of capital consumptiond
Steam railroads 1.8 2.0 2.3
Electric light and power 7.3 4.5 4.5
Telephones 10.9 11.5 7.2
Street and electric railways 4.3 ... 4.5
a July 1, 1880 to June 30, 1890 for railroads, January 1, 1881 to December 31, 1912
for electric power, January 1, 1891 to -December 31, 1902 for telephones and July 1,
1890 to June 30, 1902 for street railways.
b January 1, 1941 to December 31, 1949 for railroads, January 1, 1938 to December
31, 1950 for electric power, January 1, 1941 to December 31, 1950 for telephones and
January 1, 1913 to December 31, 1922 for Street railways.
CRatioof the average money capital flow, net of depreciation, to average value of
assets in current dollars. Estimated by computing ratio of average net capital formation
to average value of plant and equipment in current dollars.
d Ratio of average capital consumption to average value of assets in current dollars.
Assets estimated by multiplying current dollar value of plant and equipment by 1.10.
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the "first period" is July 1, 1880 through June 30, 1890, and the
"final period" is January 1, 1941 through December 31, 1949. For
convenience in appraising the long-term trends we have also
provided figures for the nine years centered in 1926.
The upper panel of the table presents the estimates of the net rate
of capital flow. These were computed by measuring the ratio of the
average annual net capital formation during each of the periods to
the annual average of the value of plant and equipment, with both
numerator and denominator expressed in current dollars. Assuming
that assets other than plant and equipment remained proportionately
about the same in the long run, over the period of interest, this ratio
would approximate the net rate of capital flow as defined above.
Most importantisthe very substantial decline,reflecting the
retardation in the rate of growth described in a previous chapter,
in railroads, electric power, and street railways, and to a smaller
extent, in telephones.
In the lower panel of the table are presented estimated rates of
capital consumption. These were computed by measuring the ratio
of the average annual capital consumption in current dollars in each
period to the average annual value of plant and equipment, similarly
figured, after inflating the latter by 10 per cent to allow for other
assets. Since such data are most commonly reported in accounting
statements in terms of original cost, it is worth emphasizing that our
estimates of both capital consumption and the value of plant and
equipment are in current dollars—as they must be to suit the require-
ments of the present analysis. Price corrections of a peculiarly
difficult character were therefore a necessary element in their
construction. It may be observed that over the period of analysis the
rate of capital consumption rose in the railroads, remained about
the same in street railways, and declined in electric power and in
telephones. Even in the last two components, however, it is significant
that the rate of capital consumption actually rose substantially in
relation to the net rate of capital flow. For the drop in the latter was
much greater than in the former. This means that in every case
capital consumption represented an expanding proportion of all
capital uses. Essentially, of course, this is a manifestation of the
combined effects of the retarded rate of growth of output and the
declining capital-product ratio, both of which are mirrored in the
fall of the net rate of capital flow. As we shall see below, it is of much
significance for financial analysis.
Some light on the factors underlying the long-run trend in the
rate of internal financing may be obtained, initially, by appraising
the situation which prevailed in the first period. The rates of internal
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financing at that time are given for each of the components of the
regulated industries in the first column of Table 51. These figures,
of course, were taken from Tables 46—49 on sources and uses of
funds. Employing the formula developed above, they may be




where the subscript I indicates the first period.4
Now with these actual rates we may compare hypothetical ones,
computed on the assumption that depreciation and net savings were
just sufficient, in combination, to cover the capital consumption






where the prinles indicate hypothetical values. It should be noted
that r is nothing more than the ratio of capital consumption to
total capital uses in the first period.5
The values of r for each of the components are given in the
second column of Table 51. In the first column are given the actual
rates of internal financing in the first period. The differences
between the two sets of figures are striking. It is evident that the
rates of internal financing in these early years provided only a small
fraction of the funds required for the consumption of capital—in the
Since we know the values of r5, a, and ,itis possible to compute the numerators of
these ratios. Thus in the case of the railroads, we may write:
0024—a,b,+k,
— 0.032+ 0.016
Hence a1b, + k1 =0.0012.This is a reasonable answer on the assumption that a, the
net savings rate, was about 10 per cent, that b, the profit rate, was about 1 per cent and
that 4, the rate of depreciation, was zero. This seems to have been approximately the
case, remembering the manner in which these terms have been defined for purposes of
this analysis—in particular, that the profit rate is the ratio of reported net income to the
value of all assets measured in current dollars. For relevant data on profits and savings
of the railroads in this period, see Historical Statistics of the United Stales, 1789—1945 (Bureau
of the Census, 1949), pp. 201 and 205, and W. H. S. Stevens and E. S. Hobbs, "Analysis
of Steam Railway Dividends, 1890—1941" (Interstate Commerce Commission, mimeo-
graphed, November 1943), p. 22.




where Cis capital consumption, Xis the net capital flow, and A is the value of total assets.
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TABLE 51
Comparison of Actual and Hypothetical Rates of Internal Financing
TI T -; T2
Steam railroads 0.024 0.33 0.42 0.92 1.02
Electric light and power 0.076 0.33 0.24 0.58 0.50
Telephones 0.063 0.38 0.30 0.46 0.41
Street and electric railways 0.014 0.26 0.27 1.50 0.14
Source: Dates of first and final periods, given in footnotes to Table 50. Actual rates
of internal financing, from Tables 46 through 49. Values of a and fi, fromTable 50.
Definitions of the rates are as follows:
actual rate of internal financing in the first period.
= , wherea =netrate of capital flow and fi =rateof capital con-
a1 + ,9
sumption and subscript 1 indicates first period values.





=actualrate of internal financing in final period.
case of the steam railroads and Street railways, considerably less
than one-tenth, and for the others less than one-fourth.
The discrepancies, of course, reflect the absence of depreciation
accounting referred to above. They also illuminate the extent to
which business properties were being overvalued in the earlier years,
for new assets were capitalized with little or no offset for wear and
tear, aging, or obsolescence. This was clearly a situation which could
not under any likely circumstances persist indefinitely. Sooner or
later the financial practices in vogue would have been certain to
affect the yield accruing to investors in these industries. As yields
declined with the continued write-up of assets, the availability of
additional external capital would have diminished or have been
dissipated entirely.6 Totally aside from this, the more extensive use
of depreciation accounting was subsequently encouraged or enforced
by the regulations of public administrative agencies as well as by the
nature of corporate interests under the income tax laws. Thus, in
one sense, the substantial excess of capital consumption over the
gross retention of funds in the first period was itself a factor which
induced a sharp rise in internal financing in later years. Even if
Of course partial and temporary correctives occurred in the latter decades of the
nineteenth century during major business cycle crises and depressions, many of which
had strong financial overtones. During such periods assets were written down, though
the long-term trend remained upward. The views concerning business cycles expressed
by Thorstein Veblen in The Theory of Business Enterprise (Scribner, 1935) are based largely
on the observation of such phenomena.
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there had been no change in the rate of growth, a rise in internal
financing would have been necessary on the grounds outlined. This
is shown by the figures in the third column of Table 51. Here, we
have computed values of rinaccord with the following equation:
2+ 2
where the subscript 2 represents the final period. In particular, r
representsthe rate of internal financing which would have existed in
the final period if (1) the net rate of capital flow had remained as it
was in the first period, and (2) internal financing had been just
sufficient to meet the prevailing rate of capital consumption. For
comparison, the actual rate of internal financing in the final period
is shown in the last column of the table.
Thus, a substantial increase in internal financing over the seventy-
year span of our study would have been necessary even if the rate
of growth in the regulated industries had not been dampened. The
need to cover replacement alone would have pushed the value of r
up from 2 to 42 per cent in the railroads, from less than 8 to 24 per
cent in electric power, from 6 to 30 per cent in telephones and from
one to 27 per cent in Street railways. Comparison with the last
column of the table shows that in the first three components these
hypothetical advances account for from one-third to two-thirds of
the actual increase in internal financing over the period of study.
In street railways the hypothetical rate of internal financing is even
greater than the actual rate in the final period.
Employing the same general method, we may now evaluate the
effect of the retarded net rate of capital flow. To do this, we compute
a second hypothetical rate of internal financing for the final period,




Itis the rate which would provide internal funds just sufficient for
capital consumption, given the net rate of capital flow actually then in
progress. Thus, r2" differs from 4onlyin the net rate of capital flow
assumed.
The difference in the figures in the third and fourth columns of
Table 51, therefore, may be said to reflect the impact of this single
factor in isolation. The retardation in the net rate of capital flow
over the seventy years was sufficient alone to have raised the rate of
internal financing from 42 to 92 per cent in railroads, from 24 to
58 per cent in electric power, from 30 to 46 per cent in telephones,
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and from 27 to 150 per cent in Street railways. Moreover, comparison
between the fourth and fifth columns of the table shows that this
hypothetical rate was in every case, save street railways, very close
to the actual rate of internal financing in th final period. This
means, essentially, that the sharp rise in internal financing over the
period of study may be accounted for primarily in terms of two
factors: (1) the need for correcting the initial deficiencies in capital
consumption allowances which existed in the first period, and (2)
the expanding relative importance of capital consumption in all uses
of capital, springing from the retarded rate of growth of total assets.
For both of these factors—and these alone—are reflected in our
computations of r.
Giventhe rough nature of our data, we may judge that the
figures in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 51 are in approxi-
mate equality for steam railroads, electric power, and telephones.
Obviously, this is not so for street railways. The great excess of the
required rate of internal financing (4')overthe actual rate in this
case is of considerable significance. It is in fact a symptom of the
disaster which, before the end of the final period of analysis, had
already overtaken this component. (The final period for street rail-
ways—from the beginning of 1913 to the end of 1922—is much
earlier than for other components.) Overexpansion and the general
failure to adopt sound methods of finance had in the 1920's brought
many lines to insolvency. Income, in the aggregate, was insufficient
to meet capital replacement. As the competition of the automobile
intensified, this industry contracted swiftly. The final period of our
financial analysis was a time of transition, in which the contraction
process in street railways was begun.
For the other components, the experiments above appear to
provide a sufficient—though, of course, not necessary—explanation
for the observed rise in internal financing. Nevertheless, we may
inquire concerning the possible role of other influences. One inter-
pretation of our analysis so far would suggest the conclusion that
the rates of net savings (a) and depreciation (k) had been raised in
keeping with the long-run advance in the relative importance of
capital consumption, together with the need for correcting the initial
deficiency in retention that was characteristic of the earlier years.
Another possibility is that the rates of retention—a and k—remained
the same, but that the profit rate (b) increased by an amount
sufficient to accomplish the same end. Available data, however, do
not support the latter thesis. There is some evidence that the profit
rate (in the sense in which it has been defined in this section)
remained about the same in the long run in the Street railways which
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avoided insolvency, declined slightly in telephones and electric
power,7 and increased in the railroad component,8 over the roughly
seventy-year span. But cyclical fluctuations aside, none of these
trends appears to have been pronounced. The substantial rise in
internal financing in railroads, electric power, and telephones must
have been accomplished, in the main, through boosts in the ratesof
retention.
Probing further, we may inquire concei'ning the influence of
prices. The price level—as such—does not appear in our formula.
No mention has been made of it as a factor tending to boost the rate
of internal financing. And yet prices in general, and capital goods
prices in particular, moved securely upward from the 1890's onward,
cyclical movements aside. Depreciation charges must have fallen far
short of capital consumption figured at reproduction cost through
most of this period. For in all of our components the original cost of
property was employed as the entire, or the principal base upon
which such costs were levied. Was not the price level, then, an
important factor stimulating the advance in internal financing——
and one which we have thus far overlooked?
Our answer to this question must be negative. An advance in
prices affects capital goods purchased for expansion as well as those
purchased for replacement. Indeed it is unlikely that any element of
capital costs would remain entirely unaffected. Hence, an inflation
does not necessarily increase capital replacement requirements
relative to other uses. To be sure, when prices rise, business concerns
are compelled to boost their accounting rates of depreciation (levied
on original costs) or the proportion of reported profits retained, or
both, if replacement costs are to be met. But this would not increase
the rate of internal financing; indeed, it would only keep it from





where R =retainedprofits, P =totalnet profits, D =depreciation
charges,JV =netcapitalflow, C =capitalconsumption, and
A =valueof assets.
Eli Winston Clemens, Economics and Public Utilities (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950),
pp.233—234.
Stevens and Hobbs, op. cit., p. 22.
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A rise in prices would boost jV, A, and C in the same proportion,
so that the denominator of r would not be changed. If profits rose
in proportion to prices, then so long as the net savings rate ()
wasmaintained, the first term in the numerator (ab) would remain
unchanged. If profits did not increase so rapidly,would need to
be advanced in order to keep ab the same. Concerning the second
term in the numerator, the results are fairly certain. Since D depends
on the accounting rates of depreciation figured on a base of original
costs, it would remain unchanged in inflation, or would rise only
with a substantial lag. Hence, in order to maintain k unchanged,
an advance in D would be necessary. In short, inflation requires a
rise in accounting depreciation rates (affecting k through D) and
perhaps a rise in the net rate of savings (a) simply to maintain the
prevailing gross rate of internal financing (r). Since r advances
substantially over the period of study, in the face of progressive
inflation, it is apparent that k or a, or both, must have been boosted
by very large amounts.
Finally, we may recall that our analysis of Tables 46 through 49
showed, in general, that both a and k were boosted over the period
studied. Yet, one may ask why the net rate of savings (a) should
share at all in an advance which is designed to provide internal
funds primarily for capital replacement? Why should not k alone be
expanded sufficiently for this purpose? One possible answer may be
found in the numerous institutional obstacles to swift and extensive
increases in accounting rates. In the face of these, especially in
periods of broad price advance, the deficiency in the amount of
internal funds generated was apparently more easily taken up, at
least in part, by increases in a.
One of the characteristics of the regulated industries disclosed in
the previous chapters casts a further light on the phenomena under
review. We find that the rise in internal financing did little more—
at most—than parallel the rise in the aggregate cost of replacing
capital consumed, relative to all capital requirements. It would be
wrong, nevertheless,to conclude that internal sources did not
contribute to a net advance in productive power. For we have seen
that a sharp and steady rise in the productivity of physical capital
was an outstanding characteristic in this segment of the economy
almost throughout the period of study. New plant and equipment
was nearly always materially more efficient than the old facilities
they replaced. Hence, retained earnings accomplished something
more than the limited objective of keeping the physical capital
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stock intact. In some part they have also contributed to the
expansion of productive capacity.
Long- Term Debt and Equity
Brief reference may be made to one other significant alteration in
the pattern of financing of the regulated industries over the spans
covered by our sources and uses tabulations. This is the shift from
equity to debt financing evident in each of our components. Of
course we refer to a shift in the proportions of these methods of raising
capital. Financing through the issue of long-term obligations was
substantial in the regulated industries from their very beginnings.
Of our components, only in telephones in its earliest days was less
than a third of all capital funds obtained through the incurrence of
long-term debt. For in the segment of the economy in which our
interest centers, the conditions are inherently propitious for such
obligations. The shouldering of a substantial burden of fixed charges
is indeed possible only in situations in which both borrowers and
lenders may share a reasonable degree of confidence in their safety.
The size and quasi-monopoly positions of the firm in the regulated
segment provide the necessary qualifications. For they yield the
promise of the magnitude and steadiness in the gross income flow
which alone can render substantial long-term debt financing
feasible.
Such considerations suggest a persistent difference between the
regulated industries and the remainder of the economy. Available
data bear this out. At the end of 1946 in the regulated industries, in
the aggregate, the total value of bonds and mortgages outstanding
was 21.5 billion dollars and of stocks, 23.9 billion. For all non-
financial corporations exclusive of utilities, the value of bonds and
mortgages outstanding was 12.2 billion dollars and of stocks, 43.4
billion. Thus the ratio of fixed debt to stocks was 90 per cent in the
regulated industries and less than 30 per cent in the others. Nor is
this discrepancy to be accounted for only by differences in the size
of firm. In nonfinancial corporations, exclusive of the regulated
industries, with assets of 100 million dollars or more, the total of
bonds and mortgages outstanding at the end of 1946 was 4.4 billion
dollars against 14.3 billion in stocks.'° The ratio of the former to the
latter is little more than 30 per cent. One must conclude that dis-
tinctive circumstances in the regulated industries, aside from mere
Cf. Simon Kuznets, "Factors in the Demand for Capital Funds" (Work Memo-
randum No. 43, National Bureau of Economic Research, mimeographed, May 1952),
p. 21.
'°Statisticsof Income for 1946, Part 2 (Bureau of Internal Revenue), Tables 4 and 6.
Quoted in Kuznets, op. cit., pp. 22—23.
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size of firm, invite the use of long-term debt financing. The relatively
stable character of their incomes, springing from positions of
monopoly as well as—in some cases—the nature of their products,
is surely one of these. The conditions of public regulation, as
explained later, is another.
We return to the trend over time in the proportion of long-term
debt financing, as evidenced in the data of Tables 46 through 49.
In the railroads in the 1880's, 55 per cent of all sources of capital
were obtained through bonds against 43 per cent through stocks.
Of the net new issues (gross of investment in affiliated companies) in
this period, then, bonds represented about 56 per cent. This pro-
portion rose steadily for railroads as long as external financing
remained a significant factor. In the 1914—20 period, bonds and
mortgages accounted for all the long-term funds obtained and in the
succeeding decade of the 1920's, for more than 70 per cent. The
experience of the 1930's disclosed the dangers of so heavy a burden
of fixed charges in a component which was more volatile than the
average regulated industry and was subject—to boot—to the intense
competition of related services. Between 1930 and 1950 fixed obliga-
tions in substantial volume were redeemed by the railroads. But by
this time internal financing provided virtually all the funds required,
in the aggregate, and there was no need for equity financing. Note,
however, that internal financing itself materially enhanced the value
of existing equity claims in the railroads. As pointed out earlier,
neither in this nor in any of the other components did short-term
debt assume much significance, except for very brief periods.
In the other regulated industries for which we have compiled
data the swing to long-term debt financing was also pronounced. In
electric light and power in the 1881—1912 period, bonds represented
43 per cent of total net new issues (gross of investment in affiliated
companies). The advance in succeeding decades brought the pro-
portion to 58 per cent in the final period of the 1940's. In this
segment, external financing remained of considerable importance
throughout our period of study, despite the rise in the magnitude of
internal sources. In telephones the rise inthe proportion of bonds,
similarly figured, was from 22 per cent in the 1891—1902 period to
85 per cent in the 1940's. Even in the brief span of our record for
street railways, the proportion rose from 44 to 100 per cent. Thus
it is seen that in all components there was a marked shift from major
reliance on stocks in the securing of external funds to major—or
complete—reliance on fixed indebtedness.
Of course, the significance of this trend must be viewed in context.
Its impact upon financial structures is substantially modified by the
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expansion of equity claims through internal financing. Nevertheless
the trend remains important for financial markets in general as well
as for the industries themselves and must be viewed, essentially, as a
manifestation of a distinctive orientation in the regulated segment
evident in their earliest records. The principal factor underlying the
swing would appear to be the existence of regulation itself. For this
was an influence which gathered force through the years as public
controls were extended, reinforced, and generalized, and was super-
imposed on the other characteristics of these industries benign to the
growth of long-term debt. Wherever public regulation establishes
permitted returns on total investment, and wherever it includes
interest payments in costs, it provides an inevitable bias in industry
for debt financing. The rewards for "trading on the equity" in
monopolistic industries, in which public regulation aims at a fair
return on total investment, acquire in this way an extraordinary
degree of security which cannot be approached in other sectors of the
economy.
In addition, of course, other well-known characteristics contribute
to the trend toward debt financing, but these are common to all
corporate industry and are of much more recent origin. They are
also less puissant as judged by the reaction of the corporate sector
exclusive of the regulated industries. Perhaps the most significant of
these are the rise in the corporate income tax and the growing im-
portance in capital markets of institutional investors, restricted either
by legal limitation or preference to the purchase of bonds, or both.
Appendix: The Derivation of the Equation for the
Rate of Internal Financing
Holding prices constant, we may define all the uses (U) of capital
as equal to capital consumption (C) plus the net growth in the value
of assets (X), or
(1) U=C-j-X
If each of these magnitudes is expressed in current values, rather
than in constant dollars, the equation still holds, but then JVmust
be defined as the net flow of una's during the period, since the value
of assets would fluctuate also with prices. In either case, however,
we may express .iV as a ratio to the value of assets (A), as in:
(2)
Equation (2) is equivalent to the rate of growth of assets, if cor-
rection is made for price changes. If A and J'I are expressed in terms
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of current values, this is no longer true. Still, even in the latter case
the long-run trend ofwould roughly approximate the secular
behavior of the net rate of growth, being materially distorted only
if the price change is brisk and the finite intervals over which the
growth rate is computed are substantial. For if values are measured
in current dollars, both the numerator as well as the denominator
are influenced by price fluctuations. Nevertheless, when measured
in current dollars, we shall term o the net rate of capital flow, to
distinguish it from the growth rate. And since for the consideration
of financial relations this is most convenient, we shall deal throughout
this appendix with actual money flows, uncorrected for price
changes, and shall continue to measure total assets in terms of
current dollars.
We shall measure C in terms of current dollars—i.e. at replace-





wesubstitute in 1 to obtain:
(4) U=caA+18A
Now the sources (S) of money capital may be equated to retained
profits (R) plus depreciation charges (D) plus all external sources of
capital (E), as in:
(5) S=R+D+E
The net savings rate may therefore be expressed by:
(6)
where Pnet profits.
The profit rate may be expressed by:
(7)
and the depreciation rate by
(8)
A
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It should be noted that D is not the same as C, defined above.
The magnitude of D is the arbitrary result of the particular account-
ing convention used by industry. Conceivably, D could be zero, even
though C—the actual capital consumption at replacement cost—
were very large.




Substituting 10 in 9 we obtain:
(12) R =abA




theproportion of all sources of capital obtained from retained
profits and depreciation. Substituting from 11 and 12 in the
numerator of 13, we get:
abA + IcA
(14) r=s
SinceS and U must be equal we may substitute from 4 in the






Hence, we conclude that the rate of internal financing may be
analyzed in terms of five ratios. It will vary directly with the net
savings rate (a), with the profit rate (b), and with the depreciation
rate (k). It will vary inversely with the net rate of capital flow ()
andthe rate of capital consumption (j9). All relationships hold with
the usual ceteris paribus assumption. Nevertheless, the last phrase of
these conclusions would come as a surprise unless it were recalled
that we have distinguished between the rate of depreciation and that
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Inequation 16 the rate of internal financing varies directly with
capital consumption, so long as ab is less than ,i.e.so long as the
gross retention of funds does not already account for the entire
volume, or more, of capital requirements." But the postulate under-
lying this formulation is unrealistic. We have confined attention,
therefore, to equation 15.
11Thevalue of rcouldbe greater than unity, as it was in the railroads in the 1940's,
if the flow of funds from external sources were negative.
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